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Abstract 
Incommensurability was Kuhn’s worst mistake.  If it is to be found anywhere in science, 
it would be in physics.  But revolutions in theoretical physics all embody theoretical 
unification.  Far from obliterating the idea that there is a persisting theoretical idea in 
physics, revolutions do just the opposite: they all actually exemplify the persisting idea of 
underlying unity.  Furthermore, persistent acceptance of unifying theories in physics 
when empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted means that 
physics makes a persistent implicit assumption concerning unity.  To put it in Kuhnian 
terms, underlying unity is a paradigm for paradigms.  We need a conception of science 
which represents problematic assumptions concerning the physical comprehensibility and 
knowability of the universe in the form of a hierarchy, these assumptions becoming less 
and less substantial and more and more such that their truth is required for science, or the 
pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all, as one goes up the hierarchy.  This 
hierarchical conception of science has important Kuhnian features, but also differs 
dramatically from the view Kuhn expounds in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
In this paper, I compare and contrast these two views in a much more detailed way than 
has been done hitherto.  I show how the hierarchical view can be construed to emerge 
from Kuhn’s view as it is modified to overcome objections.  I argue that the hierarchical 
conception of science is to be preferred to Kuhn’s view. 
 
Keywords: T. S. Kuhn, incommensurability, unification, physical comprehensibility of 
the universe, metaphysical paradigm, science without revolutions. 
 
1 Incommensurability, Kuhn and Faraday 
Decades ago, I was a visiting research fellow at the Centre for Philosophy of Science, 
Pittsburgh University.  I was sitting in my office in the great Cathedral of Learning when 
in came Thomas Kuhn, unannounced.  We had never met before.  There was no small 
talk.  We plunged immediately into a ferocious but entirely friendly argument about 
incommensurability.  He, of course, was for it, I was against.  We argued for half an hour 
or so.  I had well-prepared arguments, for I had argued with Paul Feyerabend about 
incommensurability on a number of occasions.  I understand, in fact, that 
incommensurability was something that Feyerabend and Kuhn cooked up together.  I 
failed completely to convince Feyerabend that incommensurability is a mistake.  And on 
the occasion when I met him in Pittsburgh, I failed to convince Kuhn. 
I admire Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions enormously.  It does, however, 
get some important things wrong.  Its worst mistake is incommensurability. 
It always astonished me that anyone took incommensurability seriously for a moment, 
especially as Michael Faraday solved the problem around 1834, long before Kuhn and 
Feyerabend invented it.  In putting forward his new, revolutionary theory of electrolysis, 
Faraday encountered just the kind of problem Kuhn describes in Structure.  Faraday’s 
new theory not only contradicted existing theories of electrolysis: it contradicted the very 
terms then in use to describe the phenomena of electrolysis.  These terms made 
theoretical presuppositions that clashed with Faraday’s theory.  The phenomena were 
described in such a way that Faraday’s theory was excluded from the outset.  For 
example, the term “pole”, referring to what we today would call “electrode”, carried the 
theoretical presupposition that a pole was a centre of an attractive or repulsive force.  
This clashed with Faraday’s theory. 
Faraday solved the problem by inventing, in collaboration with William Whewell and 
others, a whole series of observational terms deliberately designed to be neutral between 
the competing theories.  Thus were born the terms we use today: electrode, electrolyte, 
electrolysis, anode, cathode, ion, anion, cation.
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This strategy of Faraday’s can always succeed, I claim, whenever there are competing 
theories about the same, or overlapping, phenomena.  It will always be possible to 
concoct observational terms that are neutral between the two theories, and which can be 
used to describe phenomena that constitute crucial experiments intended to decide 
between the two theories.  If, for example, we wish to compare predictions of Newtonian 
mechanics and special relativity, we can describe experimental results employing 
relational notions of length, time and mass (related to this or that inertial reference 
frame).  Both theories predict results described in this way.  If Newtonian theory predicts 
an outcome of such and such absolute (non-relational) length, time interval or mass, it 
follows immediately that it predicts the same relational length, time interval or mass. 
It is very striking that Kuhn seems nowhere to have considered the strategy just 
indicated.  In Structure he does consider the quite different strategy of constructing an 
observation language that is entirely devoid of theoretical presuppositions, and very 
reasonably rejects the idea as one which cannot be realized.  But that idea is quite 
different from Faraday’s – which Kuhn just overlooks.2 
But how seriously did Kuhn take incommensurability?  What exactly did he mean by 
it?  In Structure, in support of incommensurability, Kuhn argues that, in a revolutionary 
situation, the old and new paradigms contradict one another, depict different worlds, use 
different terminology or give different meanings to the same terminology, interpret some 
observational and experimental data differently, and give a different emphasis to how 
important it is to solve this or that empirical problem.  All this, together with much of the 
rest of what Kuhn says in Structure concerning incommensurability, can be interpreted as 
amounting to no more than either psychological or sociological remarks about the 
difficulties those who accept different paradigms have in understanding one another, or 
epistemological or methodological remarks about the lack of decisive grounds for 
accepting and rejecting paradigms in revolutionary situations.  None of this amounts to 
incommensurability in the strong sense that it is impossible to assess the respective 
scientific merits of two competing paradigms objectively.
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At two points in Structure, however, Kuhn does commit himself to defending 
incommensurability in this strong sense.  First, he argues, in effect, that in order to assess 
the scientific merits of two paradigms objectively, we need either agreed “concrete 
operations and measurements that the scientist performs in his laboratory” or a “neutral 
observation-language, perhaps one designed to conform to the retinal imprints that 
mediate what the scientist sees” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 125).  But laboratory “operations and 
measurements are paradigm-determined” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 126).  And the task of 
constructing a “pure observation-language” free of theoretical presuppositions seems 
hopeless.  The conclusion, for Kuhn, seems inescapable.  There are no agreed empirical 
data which can provide an impartial basis for assessing the relative merits of the two 
paradigms.  Incommensurability in the strong sense seems inescapable. 
Second, Kuhn concludes Structure by claiming “We may…have to relinquish the 
notion…that changes of paradigm carry [us] closer and closer to the truth”.4  This is a 
devastating admission.  It amounts to declaring that we have no objective, rational 
grounds (however tentative) for holding that there is progress in knowledge across 
revolutions.  All the previous sterling work of Structure in depicting the way science does 
make progress by means of the puzzle solving of normal science, the discovery of 
anomalies, the grudging recognition of crisis leading to fully fledged revolution is, with 
this single admission, thrown to the winds.  The long, arduous, tortuous build-up to 
revolution has, as its culminating achievement – no progress in knowledge whatsoever.  
And the only ground for this extraordinary admission has to be incommensurability in a 
very strong sense.  Not just in the revolutionary situation, but long afterwards, when the 
new paradigm has had ample time to prove its worth, there are still no objective, rational 
grounds for holding, even tentatively, that it constitutes progress in the sense that it is 
closer to the truth than the old paradigm. 
Kuhn could have avoided this disastrous outcome if he had taken note of Faraday’s 
straightforward solution to the problem, in 1834, well over a century before 
incommensurability was invented. 
 
2. Revolutions in Physics all Reveal the Persisting Theme of Unification 
There is something even more seriously wrong with incommensurability.  Were it to be 
found anywhere in science, it would be in theoretical physics.
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  But revolutions in 
theoretical physics have one striking feature in common: they all embody theoretical 
unification.  Revolutions associated with Galileo, Newton, Lavoisier, Dalton, Faraday 
and Maxwell, Mendeleev, Rutherford, Einstein, Bohr, Schrödinger, Dirac, Tomonaga, 
Schwinger and Feynman, Yang and Mills, Weinberg and Salam, Gell-Mann and Zweig 
have all been unifying revolutions.  Galileo contributed to the unification of terrestrial 
and astronomical phenomena by revealing phenomena in the heavens similar to those 
found on earth.  Newton, in unifying Kepler and Galileo, unified terrestrial and 
astronomical motion.  Maxwell’s theory of the electromagnetic field unified electricity, 
magnetism and optics, and subsequently radio, infrared, ultraviolet, X, and gamma rays.  
Special relativity brought greater unity to Maxwell’s theory, unified energy and mass by 
means of E = mc
2
, and partially unified space and time to form space-time.  General 
relativity unified gravitation and space-time by absorbing gravitation into a richer 
conception of space-time.  The theory of elements and chemical compounds initiated by 
Lavoisier brought astonishing unification to chemistry, in reducing millions of different 
sorts of elementary substances to around the one hundred of the elements.  Quantum 
theory and the theory of atomic structure brought massive unification to atomic theory, 
properties of matter, interactions between matter and light.  Instead of nearly 100 
elements plus electromagnetic radiation, the theory postulates just four entities: the 
electron, proton, neutron and photon.  Instead of a multiplicity of laws concerning the 
chemical and physical properties of matter, there is Schrödinger’s equation.  Quantum 
electrodynamics unifies quantum theory, special relativity and classical electrodynamics.  
The electro-weak theory of Weinberg and Salam partially unifies the electromagnetic and 
weak forces.  The quark theory of Gell-Mann and Zweig brought greater unity to the 
theory of fundamental particles: a large number of hadrons were reduced to just six 
quarks.  Quantum chromodynamics brought further unification to the theory of 
fundamental particles by providing a quantum theory of the strong force.  The standard 
model, the current quantum theory of fundamental particles and the forces between them, 
partially unifies the electromagnetic, weak and strong force.  The unification is only 
partial because the different forces are all locally gauge invariant, but different kinds of 
locally gauge invariant forces nevertheless, observing different symmetries.  And the 
theory postulates a number of distinct particles with different, even though related, 
properties.  Supersymmetry seeks to unify fermions and bosons.  Superstring theory 
attempts to reduce all particles to just one kind of entity – the quantum string in ten or 
eleven dimensions of space-time, observing just one law of evolution.  It seeks to unify 
the standard model and general relativity. 
This persistent theme of theoretical unification through revolutions in physics indicates 
that there is something very seriously wrong with Kuhn’s idea that nothing theoretical 
persists through revolutions.  As one author has remarked “Far from obliterating the idea 
that there is a persisting theoretical idea in physics, revolutions do just the opposite in 
that they all themselves actually exemplify the persisting idea of underlying unity!”.6 
But is there really a persistent thesis of theoretical unity here?  Does not unification 
mean different things in these diverse cases?  Elsewhere a detailed account has been put 
forward as to what it means to say of a physical theory that it is unified.
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  According to 
this view, all the above kinds of unification are varieties of just one generic notion of 
unification.  I now attempt, very briefly, to explain the point. 
A key problem confronting any account of theoretical unity is that any theory, however 
beautifully unified, can always be reformulated to become horribly disunified, and vice 
versa.
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  It is this problem that most accounts fail to solve.
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  In order to solve it we need to 
appreciate that unity is a feature, not of the theory itself, but rather of what it asserts 
about the world – the content of the theory, in other words.  Varying the formulation has 
no affect on the degree of unity of the theory, as long as the content remains the same 
throughout the changes of formulation.   
We can now define theoretical unity like this.  In order to be unified, the content of a 
dynamic physical theory must be such that, what the theory asserts to exist that 
determines the way events evolve in space and time, must be precisely the same 
throughout all the possible phenomena to which the theory applies.  Or, put another way, 
the content of the dynamic laws governing the way events evolve, specified by the 
theory, must be the same for all possible phenomena to which the theory applies.  If there 
are different laws for N distinct ranges of phenomena, the degree of disunity of the theory 
equals N.  For unity we require N = 1.   
There is now a refinement.  The content of the laws governing the way events evolve 
may differ in different ways and to different extents as one moves around in the space, S, 
of all possible phenomena to which the theory in question applies.  This content may 
differ in different space-time regions; or for different values of variables, such as mass or 
charge; or the theory may postulate more than one force, one operating in one region of 
the space S, another operating in another region of S; or the theory may postulate 
different kinds of entity, particles with different dynamic properties for example, one 
kind present in one region of S, another present in another region of S.  According to the 
view under discussion, eight different kinds of disunity can be distinguished in this way.  
All the apparently diverse unifications achieved in physics, mentioned above, eliminate 
disunity of one or other of these eight kinds of disunity.
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unified account of theoretical disunity which reveals that all the different kinds of 
unification achieved in theoretical physics eliminate disunity of one or other of the eight 
kinds, all of which are aspects of the same basic notion of unity.  And this notion holds 
that, in order to be unified, a theory must be such that the same laws govern the evolution 
of events throughout all the possible phenomena to which the theory applies. 
The upshot is that, even though different kinds of unification have been achieved in 
physics as a result of theoretical revolutions, nevertheless a common theme, a common 
thesis, runs through all of them. 
 
3. Is Theoretical Unity Presupposed?  
Has physics discovered theoretical unity, again and again, in a thoroughly open-
minded way, without prejudging the matter, without presupposing, from the outset as it 
were, that unity exists in nature to be discovered?  Or, on the contrary, does the whole 
enterprise of physics just take for granted that there is some kind of underlying unity in 
nature, the thesis that this exists being a persistent, if perhaps implicit, item of scientific 
knowledge?  I now argue that the latter is the case.  This massively intensifies the charge 
against Kuhn, as we shall see. 
Consider any accepted, unified fundamental physical theory, T (Newtonian theory, 
classical electrodynamics, quantum theory, general relativity, QED, or the standard 
model).  We can concoct as many empirically more successful but disunified rivals to T 
as we please by modifying T in an entirely arbitrary, ad hoc fashion so that the new 
theory, T*, successful predicts everything T predicts, is not refuted where T is ostensibly 
refuted, and successfully predicts phenomena T fails to predict.
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more successful rivals quite properly never get considered for a moment in scientific 
practice precisely because they are disunified.  Now comes the crucial point.  In 
persistently rejecting – or rather ignoring – these endlessly many empirically more 
successful rivals to T on the grounds that they are disastrously disunified, physics thereby 
makes a big, implicit, persistent assumption: the universe is such that no disastrously 
disunified theory is true.
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Suppose physicists only accepted theories that postulate atoms, and persistently 
rejected theories that postulate different basic physical entities, such as fields — even 
though many field theories can easily be, and have been, formulated which are even more 
empirically successful than the atomic theories — the implication would surely be quite 
clear.  Physicists would just be assuming that the world is made up of atoms, all other 
possibilities being excluded from consideration.  The atomic assumption would be built 
into the way the scientific community accepts and rejects theories — built into the 
implicit methods of the community, methods which include: reject all theories that 
postulate entities other than atoms, whatever their empirical success might be.  The 
scientific community would accept the assumption: the universe is such that no non-
atomic theory is true. 
Analogous considerations arise in connection with the persistent acceptance of unified 
theories, even though endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can 
be concocted.  There appear to be no grounds for holding that a big assumption is 
implicitly being made in the first case, but no such assumption is being made in the 
second one. 
Thus, in persistently ignoring empirically more successful, disunified rivals to accepted 
theories, physics makes a persistent, substantial metaphysical assumption: the universe is 
such that all precise, seriously disunified physical theories are false.
13
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has been implicit in the methods of physics since Galileo.  It has persisted throughout all 
theoretical revolutions from Galileo’s time to our own.  It might be said to be a paradigm 
for the assessment of Kuhnian paradigms.  It is accepted as a permanent item of scientific 
knowledge independent of empirical considerations – even, in a sense, as we have seen, 
in violation of empirical considerations. 
It is at once clear that the picture of science Kuhn gives us in Structure is very 
seriously inadequate.  But so too are all those other views of science which take what 
may be called standard empiricism for granted.  By standard empiricism I mean the 
doctrine that, in science, all claims to knowledge must be decided, in the end, on the basis 
of evidence, considerations of simplicity, unity or explanatory power being taken into 
account possibly as well, the crucial point being, however, that no substantial thesis 
about the world can be accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge 
independently of evidence (let alone in violation of evidence).  Standard empiricism is a 
component of inductivism, hypothetico-deductivism, conventionalism, Bayesianism, 
constructive empiricism, most versions of scientific realism, and the views of Popper, 
Kuhn, Lakatos and most contemporary philosophers of science.  It is taken for granted by 
most scientists.  And yet, as we have seen, it is untenable. 
 
4. A New Conception of Science: Aim-Oriented Empiricism 
We need a new conception of science, one which acknowledges explicitly the permanent 
metaphysical
14
 assumption concerning unity that is implicit in those methods of physics 
which require seriously disunified theories to be rejected.  This new conception of 
science may be called aim-oriented empiricism.  It is depicted in figure 1.  Aim-oriented 
empiricism (AOE) is, in some respects, strikingly similar to Kuhn’s picture of science 
although, in other respects, it is dramatically different.  Elsewhere, AOE has been 
expounded and defended in great detail.
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The basic idea of AOE is to represent the metaphysical assumption of physics – 
implicit in the persistent acceptance of unified theories only – in the form of a hierarchy  
of assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe.  
These assumptions assert less and less as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus become 
increasingly likely to be true; and they become more and more nearly such that their truth 
is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all.  In this way a 
framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated 
methods is created within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and 
associated methods can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge 
improves.  Put another way, a framework of relatively unspecific, unproblematic, fixed 
aims and methods is created within which much more specific and problematic aims and 
methods evolve as scientific knowledge evolves.  (Science has the aim, at each level, 
from 7 to 3, to discover in what precise way the relevant assumption is true, assumptions 
implicit in aims becoming increasingly substantial and problematic as one descends from 
 
Figure 1: Aim-Oriented Empiricism 
 
level 7 to level 3.)  At any level, from 6 to 3, that assumption is accepted which (a) 
accords best with assumptions above in the hierarchy, and (b) is associated with the most 
empirically progressive research programme, or holds out the greatest promise of 
stimulating such a programme.  There is thus something like positive feedback between 
improving knowledge, and improving aims-and-methods, improving knowledge-about-
how-to-improve-knowledge.  This is the nub of scientific rationality, the methodological 
key to the unprecedented success of science.
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discovers about the nature of the universe. 
At level 7, there is the assumption that the universe is such that we can acquire some 
knowledge of our local circumstances.  If this minimal assumption is false, we have had 
it whatever we assume.  It can never be in our interests to abandon this assumption.  At 
level 6 we have the more substantial and risky assumption that the universe is such that 
we can learn how to improve methods for improving knowledge.  This promises to be too 
fruitful for progress in knowledge not to be accepted.  At level 5 there is the assumption 
that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other – it being such that something 
exists which provides in principle one kind of explanation for all phenomena.  At level 4 
there is the even more substantial assumption of physicalism, interpreted here to be the 
thesis that the universe is physically comprehensible, there being some kind of invariant 
physical entity, pervading all phenomena which (together with instantaneous states of 
affairs) determines (perhaps probabilistically) how events unfold in space and time.  The 
universe is such, in other words, that the true physical “theory of everything” is unified,17 
or fully explanatory in character.  At level 3 there is the even more substantial assumption 
that the universe is physically comprehensible in some more or less specific way.  
Superstring theory, or M-theory, might be this assumption today – or perhaps a doctrine 
that might be called Lagrangianism.
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  At level 2 we have currently accepted fundamental 
theories of physics: at present, the standard model, and general relativity.  At level 1 we 
have accepted empirical data – low level experimental laws. 
This hierarchy of metaphysical theses may seem, at first sight, somewhat baroque, but 
it should be noted that something like it is to be found at the empirical level.  There are, 
at the lowest level of this empirical hierarchy, the particular results of experiments 
performed at specific times and places.  Then, above these, there are low-level 
experimental laws, asserting that each experimental result is a repeatable effect.  Next up, 
there are empirical laws such as Hooke’s law, Ohm’s law or the gas laws.  Above these 
there are such physical laws as those of electrostatics or of thermodynamics.  And above 
these there are theories which have been refuted, but which can be “derived”, when 
appropriate limits are taken, from accepted fundamental theory – as Newtonian theory 
can be “derived” from general relativity.  This informal empirical hierarchy exists in part 
for precisely the same epistemological and methodological reasons that I have indicated 
for creating the hierarchy of metaphysical theses: so that relatively contentless and secure 
theses (at the bottom of the empirical hierarchy) may be distinguished from more 
contentful and insecure theses (further up the empirical hierarchy) to facilitate 
pinpointing what needs to be revised, and how, should the need for revision arise.  That 
such a hierarchy exists at the empirical level provides support for my claim that we need 
to adopt such a hierarchy at the metaphysical level. 
The argument for AOE comes in two stages.  First, there is the argument, sketched 
above, that persistent acceptance of unified theories means physics makes a persistent, 
substantial, highly problematic and implicit metaphysical assumption about the universe.  
Once this first stage is accepted there are then, second, the following four distinct 
arguments in support of AOE. 
1. AOE is more rigorous than all rival standard empiricist views of science in that it alone 
makes explicit, and so open to criticism and improvement, substantial, influential, highly 
problematic and implicit metaphysical assumptions of science.
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2. AOE provides us with the best methodological framework for the progressive 
improvement of the metaphysical assumptions of physics.  It does this in part by 
concentrating criticism and the development of new ideas where this is most likely to be 
fruitful, low down in the hierarchy, at levels 2 and 3, and possibly 4.  It also does this by 
ensuring that new ideas developed at these levels are constrained by empirical knowledge 
at level 1 and accepted assumptions higher up in the hierarchy, at levels 5 and above.
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3. AOE, when generalized to take into account other natural sciences besides physics, 
does better justice to scientific practice than any other view – as long as it is accepted that 
scientific practice is influenced by the scientific community’s long-standing acceptance 
of the untenable view of SE (which serves to obscure and subvert somewhat explicit 
implementation of AOE).
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4. AOE solves at least five fundamental problems in the philosophy of science: the 
problem of induction;
22
 the problem of how revolutionary new theories are discovered, 
especially in physics;
23
 the problem of explicating precisely what it means to say of a 
physical theory that it is simple, unified or explanatory;
24
 the problem of justifying 
persistent preference in physics for simple, unified or explanatory theories, and the 
problem of specifying precisely what scientific method ought to be.
25
  In addition, AOE 
has a significant implication for the solution to the problem of verisimilitude.
26
  The 
capacity to solve fundamental problems in the philosophy of science should be regarded 
as an important requirement any view of science needs to satisfy if it is to be judged 
adequate.  AOE satisfies this requirement.  No rival view does to the same extent. 
We need a revolution in our whole conception of natural science.  AOE ought to 
become the new orthodoxy, accepted and put into practice by the scientific community.  
A basic task for philosophers of science today is to get across to the scientific community 
a sense of just how decisive are the arguments against standard empiricism and for aim-
oriented empiricism. 
 
5. Kuhn and Aim-Oriented Empiricism: A Comparison 
To what extent does AOE incorporate Kuhnian features, to what extent is it quite 
different from Kuhn?  My answer may seem somewhat paradoxical. 
According to AOE, we can see natural science since Galileo as having one fixed, super 
paradigm, namely the level 4 metaphysical thesis of physicalism – the precise and 
demanding thesis that the universe is physically comprehensible.  This transforms science 
since Galileo into one long period of normal science – which is, at one and the same time, 
highly Kuhnian and wholly non-Kuhnian. 
Before I attempt to explain how AOE is able to magic away Kuhnian revolutions and 
transform centuries of intermittent scientific revolutions into one long phase of normal 
science, let me first address the question of how AOE is able to give any support to 
normal science in any circumstances whatsoever. 
The point is this.  The inspiration for AOE comes from Popper, not Kuhn, in that the 
whole idea is to modify science so that it makes explicit, and so criticizable and rationally 
improvable assumptions that are substantial, influential, problematic and implicit.  AOE 
is, if anything, more Popperian than Popper himself, in that it subjects more that is 
associated with science to an onslaught of critical scrutiny.  So how can AOE hold 
Kuhnian normal science to be good science in any circumstances whatsoever?  Popper, 
entirely understandably, resoundingly condemned Kuhnian normal science.  He 
recognized that it exists.  Indeed, he claimed to have discovered it himself decades before 
Kuhn (Popper, 1970, p. 51).  But for Popper “The ‘normal’ scientist, as described by 
Kuhn, has been badly taught.  He has been taught in a dogmatic spirit: he is a victim of 
indoctrination.”  And Popper went on to say of normal science that he saw in it “a danger 
to science and, indeed, to our civilization” (Popper, 1970, p. 53).  
All this makes perfectly good sense when viewed from the perspective of Popper’s 
falsificationism.  From this perspective, the whole point of experimental work is to 
subject scientific theories to as severe attempted empirical falsification as possible.  But 
for Kuhn, during normal science, quite properly, it is not the paradigm, or theory, that is 
put to the test, but the scientist himself.  If a paradigm fails successfully to predict some 
phenomenon, within the context of normal science, it is not the paradigm that has been 
falsified, but the scientist who has failed to solve the scientific “puzzle” that confronted 
him.  This must be, for Popper, absolute anathema, the very opposite of what it is to be 
scientific.  How then, to repeat the question, can AOE approve of anything resembling 
normal science? 
Kuhn argues that the dogmatic attitude of normal science is necessary for science to 
make progress.  Applying a paradigm to new phenomena, or to old phenomena with 
increasing accuracy, is often extremely difficult.  If every failure was regarded as a 
failure of the paradigm rather than of the scientist, paradigms would be rejected before 
the full range of their successful applications had been discovered.  As a result of refusing 
to reject a paradigm until the limits of its successes have been reached, scientists put 
themselves into a much better position to develop and apply a new paradigm.  For 
reasons such as these, normal science, despite being ostensibly designed to discover only 
the expected, is actually uniquely effective in disclosing novelty. 
To this one might add that, as long as physicists seek to apply the paradigm to an ever 
greater range of phenomena with ever greater accuracy, the paradigm is in fact being 
subjected to empirical testing, whatever the attitude of the scientists doing the work may 
be – as long as persistent predictive failure is taken seriously, in the way Kuhn describes 
(Kuhn, 1970, sections VI-VIII). 
In short, Kuhn gives excellent reasons as to why normal science is necessary for 
scientific progress – reasons which Popper just ignores.  AOE does not make the same 
mistake.  It holds that much scientific work ought indeed to resemble Kuhn's normal 
science, in part for the reasons just indicated.  But there is an even more important 
reason.  According to AOE, and in sharp contrast to Popper’s falsificationism, theoretical 
physics accepts a level 3 metaphysical assumption or “blueprint”, which exercises a 
powerful constraint on what kind of new theory physicists can try to develop, or can 
consider or accept.  This metaphysical blueprint has a role somewhat similar, in some 
respects, to Kuhn's paradigm, and theoretical physics, working within the constraints of 
the blueprint, its non-empirical methods set by the blueprint, has some features of Kuhn's 
normal science. 
Furthermore, according to AOE, other branches of natural science less fundamental 
than theoretical physics invariably presuppose relevant parts of more fundamental 
branches.  Thus chemistry presupposes relevant parts of atomic theory and quantum 
theory; biology relevant parts of chemistry; astronomy relevant parts of physics.  Such 
presuppositions of a science have a role, for that science, that is analogous to the role that 
the current level 3 blueprint, or the level 4 thesis of physicalism, has for theoretical 
physics.  The presuppositions act as a powerful constraint on theorizing within the 
science. They set non-empirical methods for that science.  Such presuppositions have a 
role, in other words, which is similar, in important respects, to Kuhn's paradigms.  They 
constitute paradigms for the assessment of paradigms, in that they persist through 
theoretical revolutions in the science in question. Viewed from an AOE perspective, one 
can readily see how and why much of science seems much more like Kuhnian puzzle-
solving rather than Popperian severe testing. 
In passing, I might mention that there are two other respects in which AOE resembles 
the picture of science depicted by Kuhn’s Structure.  First, Kuhn is at pains to emphasize 
that the paradigm is more fundamental than rules or methods.  Methods stem from the 
currently accepted paradigm (Kuhn, 1970, section V: see especially p. 41-42).  AOE 
holds a somewhat similar view, in that metaphysical assumptions, especially those low 
down in the hierarchy, at levels 3 and 4, set the non-empirical methods of theoretical 
physics.  AOE is, perhaps, more concerned to emphasize the two-way traffic between 
methods and metaphysics than Kuhn is in Structure. 
Second, metaphysical assumptions low down in the hierarchy of AOE undergo 
dramatic changes somewhat similar to the revolutionary changes in paradigm depicted by 
Kuhn during scientific revolutions.  Furthermore, in some cases, the metaphysical 
assumptions in question are all but identical to Kuhnian paradigms.  Initially, with the 
birth of modern science in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, the level 3 blueprint assumption of 
AOE took the form of the corpuscular hypothesis: the world is made up of minute, rigid 
particles which interact by contact. After Newton, and with Boscovich, this became the 
doctrine that the world is made up of massive point-particles surrounded by rigid, 
spherically symmetrical fields of force which become alternatively repulsive and 
attractive as one moves away from the particle.  This became the unified field view of 
Faraday and Einstein, particles being merely especially intense regions of the field.  This 
in turn became, after quantum theory, the quantum entity, whatever that might be, which 
in turn became the quantum field which, in turn became, perhaps, the quantum string of 
M-theory of today. 
Some of these are identified by Kuhn as paradigms – for example, the corpuscular 
hypothesis (Kuhn, 1970, p. 41). 
 
6. How Aim-Oriented Empiricism Tames Kuhnian Revolutions  
So far I have argued that AOE agrees with Kuhn in holding that something like normal 
science is necessary for scientific progress, and shares some other features with Kuhn’s 
picture of science as well.  What I have not yet explained is how AOE can conceivably 
depict science since Galileo as one long phase of normal science.  Scientific revolutions 
have undoubtedly occurred during this period.  How can AOE magic them away? 
The crucial point to note is that, during much of this time, the scientific community has 
taken for granted one or other version of standard empiricism.  In Newton’s time, science 
was understood quite differently as natural philosophy.  This intermingled science, 
metaphysics, epistemology, methodology, philosophy, even theology, and was, in a way, 
much closer to the conception of science inherent in AOE.  But then standard empiricism 
came to prevail, in part, I believe, as a consequence of the immense impact of Newton, 
his apparent success in deriving his law of gravitation from the phenomena by induction, 
his claim to have done this, and the influence of his “rules of reasoning in philosophy”, 
generally misunderstood.
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  After Newton’s great success, scientists came to believe that 
they had a definite method to employ, the inductive method of science, which they could 
be confident would meet with success.  Observation, experiment and testable theory are 
all-important in science, and philosophy, metaphysics, methodology, epistemology can 
all be ignored. 
As a result of this general acceptance of standard empiricism, whether in the form of 
inductivism or hypothetico-deductivism, the metaphysical assumptions of science are 
repressed.  There can be no sustained discussion of highly influential and problematic 
metaphysical assumptions at levels 3 and 4 as an integral part of the public face of 
science.  It is this suppression of influential, problematic metaphysical presuppositions 
that creates, artificially and unnecessarily, the drama, the ruptures, the crises, the changes 
of world view, the breakdown of rationality, of Kuhn’s scientific revolutions.  Pursue 
science in accordance with the edicts of AOE, and the very distinction between normal 
and revolutionary science begins to disappear. 
In order to see this, let us do a bit of imaginative, counterfactual history, and suppose 
that, from Newton’s time onwards, the scientific community accepted and implemented 
AOE.  At once, metaphysical theses at levels 3 to 7 become basic items of scientific 
knowledge.  Physicalism at level 4 asserts that the universe is such that the true physical 
“theory of everything” is unified (in all eight ways, with N = 1 in each case).  This means 
that only a theory of everything can be precisely true of anything.  In so far as physics 
puts forward theories about restricted ranges of phenomena, physics will advance from 
one false theory to another.  Such a mode of advance is to be expected, and is a sign of 
progress as long as each theory achieves greater unification and greater empirical success 
than its predecessor.
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  One consequence is that dynamical physical theories of restricted 
ranges of phenomena only are all false whatever their predictive and explanatory power 
may be.  They are refuted on metaphysical grounds, as it were, even if not on empirical 
grounds, and hence some sustained effort needs to be put into developing better theories, 
even in the absence of empirical difficulties. 
Thus, in addition to the tasks of normal science described by Kuhn, theoretical physics, 
pursued explicitly in accordance with AOE, acquires the new, objective tasks of 
discovering how to modify, to improve, theories at level 2, and the thesis at level 3, so as 
to remove, or at least lessen, contradictions between theories, and between levels 2, 3 and 
4.  In particular, physicists will explore modifications to the thesis at level 3 in an attempt 
to develop a thesis that accords better with the thesis at level 4.  There will be the attempt 
to formulate more precisely the best available thesis at level 3 in an attempt to turn the 
metaphysical thesis into an empirically testable theory.  The task of creating a new 
fundamental physical theory all but meets Kuhn’s requirements for puzzle solving, in that 
the task is specified, the rules of the game are specified, and what is to count as the 
solution is specified as well.  And these tasks need to be performed even if existing 
theories face no serious empirical refutations, there are no Kuhnian anomalies, and no 
Kuhnian crisis.  Dramatically new theories arise as a result, not of abrupt Kuhnian 
revolution, but of long-standing, gradual evolution, made up of many small modifications 
of levels 2 and 3, constrained by levels 1 and 4.  Many sequences of steps no doubt lead 
down blind alleys; just one or two sequences lead to a successful new unifying theory. 
There is here a largely unexplored, rich field of research in counterfactual history of 
science: to redo theoretical physics, from Galileo onwards, in the manner indicated, 
implementing the fallible but rational method of discovery of AOE.  Some modest 
contributions to this field have already been made.  The rules of the game have been 
explicated and, in particular, the different ways a theory can be unified or disunified have 
been precisely specified (see note 11).  It has been shown how, beginning with the 17
th
 
century blueprint of the corpuscular hypothesis, the concern to get this to accord better 
with the level 4 thesis of physicalism, and nothing else, leads one to modify the blueprint 
so that it becomes, in turn, the Boscovich point-atom blueprint, the unified field 
blueprint, and even something that has intimations of special relativity (Maxwell, 1998, 
pp. 80-89).  It has been argued that Einstein, in creating his special and general theories 
of relativity, exploited AOE or something very close to it quite explicitly, perhaps for the 
first time in the history of physics.
29
  It has been argued that the development of a new 
fundamentally probabilistic blueprint for physics might make sense of the mysteries of 
quantum theory, and lead to a version of the theory testably distinct from orthodox 
quantum theory.
30
  And an alternative to the level 4 thesis of physicalism has even been 
put forward.
31
 
If AOE is not put explicitly into practice, and one or other version of standard 
empiricism is accepted instead, there can be no metaphysical refutation of an empirically 
successful physical theory, and no explicit exploitation of the rational method of 
discovery of AOE in the public domain of physics – even if, privately, as it were, 
individual physicists may put something like this into practice in developing new 
theories.  Instead of new theories being developed in a collaborative way even before 
existing accepted theories have run into empirical difficulties, the tendency will be for 
most physicists to work at extending the predictive range and accuracy of existing 
theories, thus engaging in Kuhnian normal science.  The outcome will tend to be 
anomaly, crisis, revolution, as depicted by Kuhn, the product of trying to do physics in 
accordance with standard empiricism.  In short, the Kuhnian contrast between normal and 
revolutionary science is an artefact of attempting to do science in accordance with the 
untenable conception of science of standard empiricism.  Put AOE explicitly into 
scientific practice instead, and the very distinction between normal and revolutionary 
science will tend to disappear.   
It must be admitted, however, that actual physics does not altogether accord with the 
Kuhnian account.  It is not empirical problems or Kuhnian crisis that has driven so many 
theoretical physicists to work at unifying quantum theory and general relativity by means 
of superstring theory, loop quantum gravity, or in some other way.  Superstring theory 
might indeed be taken as indicative of the kind of metaphysical normal research which 
AOE advocates, and which Kuhn entirely overlooks, even as a possibility.  Superstring 
theory has been developed gradually over decades, as a major research programme, by 
thousands of physicists engaged in what might well be regarded as theoretical puzzle 
solving.  The central aim is to discover the true, unified “theory of everything”.  And yet 
superstring theory has not yet come up with one single successful empirical prediction.  It 
is, so far, pure metaphysics.
32
  All this accords beautifully with the kind of normal 
metaphysical research which AOE holds physics ought to do.
33
  Perhaps physics already 
puts AOE into practice, even though most scientists still pay allegiance to standard 
empiricism.
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There is an additional adverse consequence, stemming from the attempt to do physics 
in accordance with standard empiricism, which deserves to be mentioned.  Failure 
explicitly to improve level 3 metaphysical ideas means that the ideas that are (implicitly) 
accepted, far from leading the way to the development of new theories, in the manner of 
Einstein, instead do not even keep pace with new theories that are developed and, as a 
result, impede the interpretation and acceptance of these new theories.  Thus, acceptance 
of the corpuscular hypothesis impeded the interpretation and acceptance of Newtonian 
theory.  Huygens, in a letter to Leibniz, wrote: “Concerning the Cause of the flux given 
by M. Newton, I am by no means satisfied [by it], nor by all the other Theories that he 
builds upon his Principle of Attraction, which seems to me absurd. . . I have often 
wondered how he could have given himself all the trouble of making such a number of 
investigations and difficult calculations that have no other foundation that this very 
principle” (Koyré, 1965, pp. 117-8).  Newton in a sense agreed, as is indicated by his 
remark: “That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter, so that one body 
may act upon another, at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything 
else. . . is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical 
matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it” (Burtt, 1932, pp. 265-6).  
Once Boscovich’s subsequent blueprint is accepted, these objections disappear.  Another 
example is provided by Maxwell’s theory of electrodynamics.  Maxwell himself, and 
most of his contemporaries and immediate successors, sought to interpret the 
electromagnetic field in terms of a material substratum, the hypothetical aether, itself to 
be understood in Newtonian or Boscovichean terms.  An immense amount of effort was 
put into trying to understand Maxwell’s field equations in terms of the aether.  But once 
the unified field blueprint is accepted, Maxwell’s theory emerges as perfectly 
comprehensible and acceptable as it stands: the aether would be an unnecessary 
complication.  And, as I have already indicated, yet another example of this phenomenon 
may be provided by quantum theory.  Attempts are made to interpret quantum theory 
implicitly presupposing determinism and, when these fail, instrumentalism is assumed 
instead, which creates its own problems (Maxwell, 1993b).  What for decades was 
overlooked, and still tends to be overlooked, is the possibility of interpreting quantum 
theory in terms of what might be a more relevant fundamentally probabilistic 
metaphysical outlook.  Again and again, understanding and even acceptance of new 
theories is impeded by implicit acceptance of outdated metaphysical ideas – outdated 
because they have not been subjected to explicit criticism and attempted improvement. 
There is another consideration which strengthens my claim that physics since Galileo, 
if it had been pursued explicitly in accordance with aim-oriented empiricism, would have 
looked much more like one long phase of Kuhnian normal science.  It comes from a 
proposed solution to the problem of verisimilitude (Maxwell, 2007, pp. 393-400 430-
433).  This makes use of a notion of “approximate derivation”.  In order to illustrate this 
notion, consider the approximate derivation of Kepler’s law that planets move in ellipses 
from Newton.  First, Newton is restricted to the solar system.  Then, one lets the masses 
of the planets tend to zero.  In the limit the orbits become precisely Keplerian.  Then, one 
reinterprets what has been derived so that it applies to the solar system, the planets 
acquiring mass.  We have Kepler's law.  It is, of course, the third step which renders the 
outcome incompatible with Newton.  "Approximate derivations" of the kind here 
illustrated are to be found everywhere in physics.  Physicists neglect higher terms, and 
make other approximations, all the time in deriving laws from theories.  One might 
almost say "derivation" in physics means "approximate derivation".  So, in terms of this 
physicists' notion of derivation, we can declare that Newtonian theory can be derived 
from general relativity, and Kepler's and Galileo's laws can be derived from Newtonian  
theory, even though, strictly and logically speaking, these successive theories are all  
incompatible with one another. 
This makes the advance of physics through revolutions in retrospect much more 
genuinely accumulative, and similar to Kuhnian normal science, than one might 
otherwise suppose.  In retrospect, revolutions disappear, for quite legitimate reasons, 
quite different from those discussed by Kuhn in section XI of Structure, "The Invisibility 
of Revolutions". 
I have argued that putting AOE explicitly into scientific practice transforms science so 
that it seems to become close to normal science without revolutions as depicted by Kuhn.  
But does this really suffice to establish that science since Galileo, pursued in accordance 
with the edicts of AOE, would resemble normal science?  It might be more appropriate to 
declare that, if science had been pursued in this way, Kuhn’s distinction between normal 
and revolutionary science would no longer apply.  There would be intermittent, dramatic 
changes of theory, but such changes would be anticipated, persistently worked for and 
progressively developed, and they would occur within a context of theoretical and 
empirical continuity and growth.  Fundamental new theories in physics would not 
emerge, abruptly and inexplicably, out of the blue, in contexts of crises.  There would be 
a rational, if non-mechanical and fallible, method for their discovery and development.  
They would emerge gradually as a result of work that would have some of the features of 
Kuhnian puzzle solving of normal science.   
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 See Williams (1965, pp. 257-269).  
2
 In his work after Structure on incommensurability, Kuhn continued to ignore Faraday’s 
solution to the problem: see Kuhn (2000).  In what follows I concentrate on what Kuhn 
says in Structure, because this seems to me to be so much more striking, important and 
influential than his later work on incommensurability.   
3
 An assessment may, of course, be objective without being decisive. 
                                                                                                                                                 
4
 Kuhn (1970, p. 170).  We can take it that Kuhn is not concerned, here, with the problem 
of verisimilitude – the problem of what it means to say of two false theories that one is 
closer to the truth than the other.  His concern, rather, is that we cannot ever know of two 
paradigms that one is closer to the truth than the other – as the context makes clear. 
5
 This is because physics is the fundamental natural science.  A revolution in any other 
science – astronomy, chemistry, or geology – can exploit theoretical knowledge from a 
more fundamental science that persists throughout the revolution.   
6
 Maxwell (1998, p. 181). 
7
 See Maxwell (1998, chs. 3 and 4; 2004a, appendix, section 2; 2007, ch. 14, section 2). 
8
 See Feynman (1965, ch. 25, pp. 10-11). 
9
 Well known accounts of unification that fail to pass this hurdle are Friedman (1974), 
Kitcher (1989) and Watkins(1984, pp. 203-213).  These and other accounts are decisively 
refuted by Maxwell (1998, pp. 56-68). 
10
 For a very much more detailed account of theoretical unity along these lines, see 
Maxwell (1998, chs. 3 and 4).  See also Maxwell (2004a, appendix, section 2; 2007, ch. 
14, section 2; 2011, section 4). 
11
 Strategies for concocting empirically more successful disunified rivals to accepted 
theories are discussed in Maxwell (1974; 1998, pp. 47-54; 2004a, pp. 10-11; 2013).  
These empirically more successful theories are disunified in the two or three most drastic 
of the eight kinds of disunity indicated in the previous section. 
12
 For more detailed expositions of this argument see Maxwell (1998, chs. 1 and 2; 
2011a; 2013). 
13
 Many imprecise disunified theories will be true even in a universe that is perfectly 
physically comprehensible, in that the true physical “theory of everything”, T, is unified.  
In such a universe, T implies any number of distinct, imprecise theories applicable to 
restricted ranges of phenomena.  True disunified (but imprecise) theories can be arrived 
at by conjoining two or more such true distinct theories. 
14
 Throughout, by “metaphysical” I mean “empirically untestable”. 
15
 AOE was first put forward in Maxwell (1974); see also Maxwell (1984, chs. 5 and 9; 
1993a).  A detailed exposition and defense is to be found in Maxwell (1998); see also 
Maxwell (2002; 2004a; 2005; 2006; 2010, ch. 5; 2011a; and especially 2007, ch. 12).  
16
 See Maxwell (1998, pp. 17-19; 2004a, chs. 1 and 2).  
17
 In terms of the account of theoretical unity of the previous section, we require that the 
true “theory of everything” is unified in all eight ways, with N = 1 in each case. 
18
 This asserts that the universe is such that the true “theory of everything” can be 
formulated in terms of a unified Lagrangian (or Lagrangian density), with a single 
physical interpretation, and with a group structure which is such that it is not the product 
of sub-groups: see Maxwell (1998, pp. 88-89). 
19
 Maxwell (1998, pp. 21-23; 2002, section 6).  Others have argued that metaphysical 
presuppositions of science need to be acknowledged in order to solve the problem of 
induction: see, for example, Russell (1948, part VI) and Burks (1977, ch. 10).  But these 
authors fail to stress, as AOE does, that precisely because these presuppositions are 
substantial, influential, and purely conjectural, they need to be subjected to sustained 
criticism and attempted improvement, a new methodology being required to do this. 
20
 For details, see works referred to in note 18. 
                                                                                                                                                 
21
 See Maxwell (2004a, ch. 2).  See also Maxwell (1993a, pp. 275-305; 1998, ch. 4). 
22
 Maxwell (2007, ch. 12, section 6).  See also Maxwell (1998, ch. 5; 2004a, appendix, 
section 6). 
23
 See Maxwell (2004a, pp. 34-39 and 191-198).  See also Maxwell (1993a, pp. 275-305; 
1998, pp. 217-233). 
24
 See Maxwell (1998, chs. 3 and 4; 2004a, appendix, section 2; 2007, ch. 14, section 2). 
25
 See Maxwell (2004a, pp. 34-51). 
26
 Granted standard empiricism, physics advancing from one false theory to another poses 
a serious threat to the view that physics makes theoretical progress across revolutions.  
That physics does seem to advance in this way has even been dubbed “the pessimistic 
induction”: see Newton-Smith (1981, p. 41).  Granted AOE, however, this is precisely the 
way theoretical physics must advance if it is to make progress, step by step, towards 
capturing physicalism in a true, unified, testable physical “theory of everything”: see 
Maxwell (2007, ch. 14, section 5); see also Maxwell (1998, pp. 211-212).  
27
 Misunderstood because it was not appreciated that the three of these four rules that 
concern simplicity or unity make metaphysical presuppositions – as Newton himself 
made clear: see Newton (1962, pp. 398-400).  
28
 For more on this see Maxwell ((2007, ch. 14, section 5; 1998, pp. 211-212). 
29
 Maxwell (1993a, pp. 275-305).  
30
 Maxwell (1976; 1982; 1988; 1994; 1998, ch. 7; 2004b; 2011b). 
31
 Maxwell (2004a, pp. 198-205; 2007, pp. 389-393). 
32
 For an excellent non-technical account of superstring theory see Greene (1999). 
33
 For some reservations concerning the claim that superstring theory puts AOE into 
practice, see Maxwell (2004a, pp. 36-37 and 197-198). 
34
 Many physicists object to superstring theory on the grounds that it has made no 
successful empirical predictions and thus is not science at all – thereby revealing their 
allegiance to standard empiricism.  For criticisms of superstring theory for its lack of 
empirical success, and on other grounds, see Greene (1999, ch. 9) and Smolin (2000, pp. 
159-162). 
